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1  Introduction 
The connection between finance and investment starts with any violation of the 
Modigliani- Miller theorem, Modigliani and Miller (1958), usually modeled formally via 
imperfect information. According to Ross, Westerfield and Jordan (1993) about 80 percent 
of all financing is done with internally generated funds. Explanations for this behavior 
usually highlight the role of information asymmetries (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and 
agency issues (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) in raising the costs of external funds. 
The notion of financial constraint that is employed in this paper is that of credit 
rationing which arises due to informational asymmetry between the borrower/firm and the 
lender about the quality of project that a firm wishes to undertake and also due to the risk 
of bankruptcy in the event of the failure of the project. Gale and Hellwig (1985) compare 
optimal contracts with the first best situation. First best situations are those that arise when 
borrowers and lenders share the same information about the nature and the outcome of the 
project, that is, there are situations where there is no informational asymmetry. An optimal 
contract is incentive compatible, which allows borrowers to truthfully reveal (since the 
firm has more information about the project than the lender) the outcome of the project and 
also takes into consideration that borrowers in their optimization program account for the 
possibility of bankruptcy and the costs associated with it. Gale and Hellwig (1985) also 
show that standard debt contracts that require a fixed repayment when the firm is solvent 
and that require the firm to be declared bankrupt if this fixed payment cannot be met and 
the creditor is allowed to recoup as much of the debt as possible from the firm’s assets, are 
also optimal. In equilibrium, a standard debt contract, which is also optimal, will usually 
involve credit-rationing in the sense that the optimal loan is smaller and interest rate is 
higher than it would have been under the first best outcome. 
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Empirically, the existence of financial constraints for innovative firms is most 
frequently investigated by examining the sensitivity of R&D investment to financial 
factors, see Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), Harhoff (1998), and Mulkay, Hall and 
Mairesse (2001). It is estimated by using the same models as for physical investment, see 
Mulkay et al. (1999), that is to say, by using the reduced form of accelerator models of 
investment, see Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) and Bond, Elston, Mairesse and 
Mulkay (1997), or by using the structural framework of Euler equations as in Bond and 
Meghir (1994). Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) find a large and significant relationship 
between R&D and internal finance for US small firms in high-tech industries. Similar 
results are obtained by Mulkay et al. (2001) with French and United States firms. In 
addition, they find that cash flow has a much larger impact on R&D investment for US 
firms than for the French ones. Harhoff’s results about German firms are less conclusive. 
He finds a weak but significant cash flow effect on R&D by using an investment 
accelerator model, while Euler-equation estimates appear to be non-informative. However, 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and Cleary (1999) have provided evidence that cash 
flow sensitivity need not identify liquidity constrained firms, that is, sensitivity is not 
monotonic in the degree of constraints. Cash flow provides information about future 
investment opportunities, hence, investment cash flow sensitivity may equally occur 
because firms are sensitive to demand signals. On the theoretical side, Gomes (2001) and 
Aydogan (2003) simulate dynamic investment models, demonstrating that significant cash 
flow coefficients are not necessarily generated by financing frictions. Conversely, Gomes 
(2001) shows that financing frictions are not sufficient to generate significant coefficients 
on cash flow. 
Among the many ways to study the effect of financing frictions on physical/R&D 
investment, one is to construct an index of financial constraints based on a standard 
intertemporal investment model augmented to account for financial frictions. External 
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finance constraints affect the intertemporal substitution of investment today for investment 
tomorrow, via the shadow value of scarce external funds. Recently Gomes, Yaron, and 
Zhang (2006) showed that one can rewrite a constrained problem as an unconstrained one 
with embedded multipliers that give a characterization of the shadow value, as a measure 
of the premium on external finance. This shadow value, in turn, depends on observable 
financial variables and proxies that signal the worthiness of firms, as debt, equity, liquidity, 
cash flow, and bond ratings to name a few. Generalized method of moments estimation of 
the model provides an estimate of the shadow value that is then used as an index of 
financial constraint. Many papers in the literature on financing frictions use this approach 
to study the effect of financing premium on behavior of such variables as investment, see 
Whited (1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994), stock return, see Gomes et al. (2006) and 
Whited and Wu (2006), and the term structure of interest rates, see Dow, Gorton and 
Krishnamurthy (2004). 
However, in our data set, which we obtain from the Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS), we do not have information on balance sheets of the firms/enterprisesi , which 
would allow us to assess the effect of internal/external finance on the behavior of R&D 
investment. But, from a question asked to the firms we know whether a firm, and to what 
degree, was hampered in its pursuit of R&D activities by the presence of financial 
constraints. This avoids the task of constructing an index of financial constraint to study 
the behavior of R&D investment in the presence of capital market frictions. That is, we 
have an index of financial constraint that is a function of the financial position of the firm 
and its willingness to undertake R&D activities. The above statement needs some 
explanation. A constructed index of financial constraint is only a function of the financial 
state variable and this index is purged of the effects of future expected profitability. 
However, this is not the case for firms reporting whether they are financially constrained or 
not in our data set. In other words, the firms reporting that they are financially constrained 
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are also the ones that express a willingness to invest in R&D activities, but their financial 
position is not sound enough for them to take up R&D activities. That is, if two firms are 
equal in every respect but one firm is in a better financial position than the other, then the 
firm that is in a better financial position is less likely to hit its debt limit than the firm 
whose financial position is not sound. Ceteris paribus, the worse the financial position of 
the firm, the greater is the loan demanded, which implies that higher is the repayment 
obligation to the lending agency and hence greater the risk of bankruptcy. This risk is the 
prime factor for underinvestment. That is, firms might get some external finance to finance 
their projects, but not to the extent that they desire. 
There are many situations when the firm may report that financial factors are 
constraining innovation. The prerequisite is that the firm is attempting to undertake 
innovative activity. The firm must then consider that its attempt to pursue that activity has 
been hampered by the lack of finance and or the cost of that finance. It need not be that all 
firms that are financially constrained would report that they are financially constrained, for 
example, they may not be innovation active in the period, or they may face other kinds of 
constraints that inhibit their R&D activities, which imply that financial constraint is not 
binding. 
The aim of the paper is twin fold. The first is to study the effect of financial constraint, 
as reported by the firms among other variables, on innovation activity here measured by 
R&D investment, and secondly, to establish determinants of financial constraint. 
There are many problems one faces when estimating the impact of financial and other 
variables on innovation, selection and endogeneity of the explanatory variables being the 
chief among them. Problems of sample selection arise since only those firms report R&D 
expenditure that chose to indulge in R&D activities. Savignac (2005) examines the impact 
of financial constraints on innovation for established firms in France. An indicator based 
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on the firm’s assessment of financial constraints is found to significantly reduce the  
probability that a firm undertakes innovation activities. However, in her paper she only 
accounts for the endogeneity of the indicator, indicating whether a firm is financially 
constrained or not. But, endogeneity of other control variables could also lead to 
inconsistent estimates. To overcome the potential endogeneity of the regressors we use 
Lewbel’s approach to handling such problems. For studying the determinants of R&D 
investment we use Lewbel’s (2006) semiparametric estimator that handles both the 
problem of selection and endogeneity. For the binary response model, in which we study 
the determinants of financial constraint we employ Lewbel’s (2000, 2004) semiparametric 
binary choice model that accounts for endogeneity of the regressors. 
Our results generally support the view that financial constraints affect R&D investment 
and that the financial constraints are less binding in the presence of other constraints on 
innovation, such as market or economic uncertainty or regulation and organizational 
rigidities. Other significant determinants of R&D investment that we find are the age of the 
firms, market share, cooperation in R&D activities and firms’ share of innovative sales. 
Ideally, we would have liked to assess the impact of the financial position of the firms 
after controlling for investment opportunities or future expected profitability. However, the 
Community Innovation Surveys do not provide us with the balance sheet information of 
the firms. Instead of this financial information we include age and a dummy for group 
membership of the firm. Our results suggest that age and belonging to a group are 
significant determinants of financial constraint. We believe that these variables pick up the 
effect of financial health of the firm. Our results also suggest that the presence of other 
constraints on innovation, such as market uncertainty, regulation and organizational 
rigidities, also reduces the probability of a firm being financially constrained though not 
significantly so. Expected future profitability, as proxied by the share of innovative sales in 
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the total sales of the firm, increases the probability of financial constraint after controlling 
for information costs that are implied by the financial position of the firm, which is proxied 
by age, market share and a dummy for belonging to a group. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
presents the theoretical model of R&D investment in the presence of financial constraints 
and section 4 the empirical model. Section 5 discusses the results and section 6 concludes. 
2  Data 
The data used for our analysis are collected by Statistics Netherlands. The Dutch 
Innovation Surveys are conducted every two years. To implement our model we use the 
fourth Dutch Innovation Survey, CIS 3.5, which pertains to the years 2000-02. The 
Innovation Survey data are collected at the enterprise level. A combination of a census and 
a stratified random sampling is used. A census is used for the population of large (250 or 
more employees) enterprises, and stratified random sampling is used for small and medium 
sized enterprises. The size of an enterprise is measured by the number of employees, and 
the stratum variables are the economic activity and the size of an enterprise, where the 
economic activity is given by the Dutch standard industrial classification. 
Since in our model we want to control for the endogeneity of the regressors, we use as 
instruments lagged values of some of our potential endogenous regressors. Hence we 
merged CIS 3.5 with the CIS 3, containing information for the years 1998-2000. This 
leaves us, after cleaning the data, with a total of 3958 enterprises for our analysis out of 
which 1531 report to be innovating. 
Appendix C shows a table that is directly borrowed from the CIS 3.5 questionnaire. 
Section 8a of the table asks an innovating firm if it is hampered in its pursuit of innovating 
activities. Section 8b of the questionnaire asks the non-innovating firms if it is important 
 10
for them to take up innovating activity and whether they are hampered in some way or 
another. The number of non-innovating firms that answer in the affirmative to question 8b 
is 95. These 95 firms could be thought of as potentially innovating firms. Thus the total 
number of innovating and potentially innovating firms is 1626. If either type of firm, 
innovating as well as potentially innovating, replies in the affirmative to the general 
hampering question then it is asked to fill out Section 9, in which it is asked to specify the 
hampering factor(s) and to what extent it affects its innovation projects. We construct a 
binary variable DFIN that takes value 1 if the firm answers that, because of financial 
problems, some of its projects are (a) seriously delayed, (b) prematurely stopped or (c) did 
not start. Out of 1626 innovating as well as potentially innovating firms, 583 firms report 
that they are hampered in some way or another in their innovation activities. Of these, 178 
firms report that they are hampered due to financial reasons. 
3  The Theoretical Model 
In this section we present a model of financial constraint and then study the decision of the 
firm to innovate and how much to invest in R&D in the presence of financial constraintii . 
We refer to appendix A for a discussion of the model. 
Firms wish to undertake risky ventures but lack the necessary resources, so they turn to 
the investors (banks or other deposit-taking, financial institutions) for external finance. 
Venture capital and other types of non-deposit private equity are not considered in our 
analysis. The firm is assumed to be risk-neutral; it maximizes the expected value of its 
"wealth". The returns to the risky venture are described by a revenue function f: an 
investment of R units produces a revenue of f(s, R) units in state s, s being the state of 
nature. The revenue function is also assumed to exhibit decreasing returns to scale. 
Assume that ;.)(),( RsRsf φ= , “.” represents other parameters characterizing the firm. A 
crucial assumption is that agents have asymmetric information. The firm observes the state 
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free of charge, but the lender can only observe the state by paying some observational cost. 
Gale and Hellwig (1985) have shown that the optimal contract between the firm and the 
lender is a standard debt contract that involves a fixed repayment obligation and a 
declaration of bankruptcy if and only if the repayment obligation cannot be met, and a 
confiscation of whatever wealth remains in the event of bankruptcy. 
Under an optimal contract the firm maximizes its wealth taking into account the 
possible risk of bankruptcy and subject to the constraint that the zero profit condition of the 
lender is satisfied. The zero profit condition states that the expected return from lending to 
the firm should at least be equal to the amount that the lender can earn from lending this 
amount at the risk free rate of interest ir. Let Rop be the amount of R&D capital demanded 
by the firm under an optimal contract. 
To invoke the notion of financial constraint, let us now see what happens under the 
assumption that both the lender and the firm can directly observe the state of nature. In 
such a situation, which is termed first best, since the firm and the lender share the same 
information about the nature of the project and the lender can costlessly observe the states 
of nature, the problem is the same for the firm and for the lender. 
Let Rfb be the solution to the firm’s problem under the first best situation. Gale and 
Hellwig (1985) have shown that  that is to say that the amount of R&D capital 
demanded in the first best situation is at least as great as the amount lent under an optimal 
contract. Rfb is strictly greater than Rop if there is a positive probability of bankruptcy and 
if the cost borne by the lender for investigation in the event of bankruptcy is positive. 
opfb RR ≥
However, it should be noted that Rop is a function of the distribution of the states of 
nature over which it bases its expectations and which we seek to capture through the 
expected future profitability E(π), firm characteristics FC, the organizational and the 
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institutional constraints that the firm faces and which deter a firm from taking up R&D 
activities CON, the liquid wealth W0 that the firm has at its disposal, and the risk free rate 
of interest ir.  
 
                                                   ),,),(( irCONFCERR opop π=                (1) 
 
Gale and Hellwig (1985, 1986) and Gomes et al. (2006) show that , . 
It can be shown that  and 
0<′
irop
R 0>′
Wop
R
0>′
Eop
R 0<′
CONop
R . In words this means that as the risk free rate 
of interest rises the demand for R&D capital decreases, as the liquid wealth of the firm 
increases the demand for R&D capital increases and as the future expected profitability, 
E(π), increases the demand for R&D capital increases. Also since the fixed payment to the 
lender when the firm is solvent increases with the amount lent, the effects of ir, , E(π), 
and CON on the fixed payment to the lender are qualitatively the same as those on Rop. 
0W
Let r be the equilibrium rate of interest that the firm pays so that the lender’s zero-
profit constraint is satisfied. This rate of interest is the interest rate actually paid by the 
firm when it is not bankrupt. This implies that  
 
).( opRrr =  
Since the fixed repayment obligation by the firm to the lender increases with the amount of 
loan it can be shown that the rate of interest is non-decreasing in the amount of R&D 
demanded under an optimal contract. Equation (1) implies that 
 
                                                         ),,),(( irCONFCErr π= .                                          (2)                          
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Since the demand for R&D capital increases in expectation of future profitability it can be 
shown that  and since the demand decreases due to presence of institutional factors 
that hamper R&D activities, 
0>′Er
0<′CONr . Also since the demand for external sources of 
funding decreases with the increase in the internal wealth of the firm, this implies that 
. 0
0
<′Wr
Define the function finiii  as  
 
                                                  },),,,),({( επ irCONFCEfinfin =                                     (3)           
where, ε is an idiosyncratic disturbance term. The inequalities discussed above imply that 
,  and . We say that a firm is financially constrained if, 0≥′Enfi 0≤′CONnfi 00 ≤′Wnfi
                                                                    ,                                                           (4) Ffin ≥
where F corresponds to the threshold value on the loan that the firm can get. This 
constraint becomes binding if the rate of interest demanded by the lender on extra units of 
loan exceeds a certain threshold that the firm is unable to meet. Consequently, the firm 
would not be able to meet its required R&D investment level. The rate of interest 
corresponding to the threshold could be thought of as the interest rate on the maximum 
amount of debt a firm can incur. This threshold can differ from firm to firm depending on 
the financial position of the firm. Take the example of two firms that are equal in every 
respect but one firm has a better financial position than the other. The firm that is in a 
better financial position is less likely to hit its debt limit than the firm whose financial 
position is not sound. It should be noted that what is driving these results is the positive 
probability of bankruptcy. Ceteris paribus, the worse the financial position of the firm, the 
greater is the loan demanded, which implies that the fixed repayment obligation and the 
risk of bankruptcy are also greater. 
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4  The Empirical Model 
 
Before we set up our econometric model we would like to note that the observed R&D 
expenditure corresponds to Rop, the optimal R&D capital demanded under the 
optimal/standard debt contract, but the observed outcome is closer to the first best level if 
the firm does not report that it is financially constrained. Our objective here is to assess 
how the observed outcome/R&D expenditure behaves under the presence of financial 
constraint. 
We hypothesize that  
 
                                                               ]0[ >−= FfinIDFIN ,                                        (5)  
where DFIN is the binary variable that takes value 1 if the firm reports that it is financially 
constrained and 0 otherwise and I is the indicator function that equals one if its argument is 
true and zero otherwise. 
For our empirical analysis of the effects of financial constraints on R&D investment we 
now seek to set up a model, whose estimation will help us judge the effects of financial 
constraint on R&D investment. Any such empirical model would have to take into account 
the sample selection that arises in our data set. Also, in a model of sample selection, 
common unobservables may affect both the outcome (R&D investment) and the 
probability of selection (the decision to innovate) in unknown ways. To handle 
endogeneity in a model of sample selection we use Lewbel’s (2006) estimator, which takes 
the form of simple weighted averages, GMM or two stage least squares. Lewbel shows that 
the distribution function of potential outcomes, conditional on covariates, can be identified 
given an observed variable V, called very exogenous variable, that affects the selection 
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probability in certain ways and is conditionally independent of the error terms in a model 
of potential outcomes. The nice thing about this estimator is that it is semiparametric and 
there are no stringent assumption on the error termsiv . 
We specify the model below. Equation (6) is our main regression equation in which we 
seek to establish our determinants of R&D intensity, (7) is our innovator selection 
equation, and (8) is the indicator function given in (5). 
Let LRi be log of R&D intensity of a plant i, where R&D intensity is defined as level of 
R&D investment in a year divided by the year value of the plant i's sales , 
 
                                    iiiiiii DVXDFINSINVLR )( 4321 εββββ ++++=                             (6) 
                                                 )],,,(0[ iiiiii eXDFINSINVMVID +≤=                             (7) 
                                                                       ]0[ >−= iii FfinIDFIN ,                           (8) 
where Di equals one if the firm i is an innovator and zero otherwise. If Di=1 we observe 
some R&D expenditure which may also be zero. In our estimation we use log of R&D 
intensity instead of R&D expenditure. For those firms that are innovators and for whom 
R&D intensity is zerov , log of R&D intensity is taken to be a little lower than the lowest 
R&D intensity for a firm with positive R&D expenditure. We do this because logarithmic 
transformation of zero is not defined and therefore such an exercise prevents us from 
losing any data during estimation. 
Our variable Vvi , the very exogenous regressor, is the size of firms measured in terms 
of employment. The assumption on V is that it is an observed, continuously distributed 
covariate (or known function of covariates) with large support. The coefficient on V has 
been normalized to 1. In the Schumpeterian tradition, it makes sense to include size as an 
explanatory variable in the main as well as the selection equation. It can also be argued that 
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if there are fixed costs of investing, then as Cohen and Klepper (1996) argue, large firms 
are more incited to engage in innovative activities because they can amortize these costs by 
selling more units of outputvii . 
M is an unobserved latent variable which is a function of explanatory variables other 
than size. We also assume M to be linear function of its arguments. I is the indicator 
function that equals one if its argument is true and zero otherwise. 
SINV is the share of sales with innovative products in total sales of the firm. Analogous 
to the literature on physical investment  could be thought of as a proxy for q which is 
the expectation of the marginal contribution of new capital goods to future profit. We also 
experimented with alternative proxies for q, like lagged values of share of Innovation
SINV
viii . 
Mulkay et al. (2001) assess the impact of cash flow or profits on R&D and physical 
investment. The share of sales with innovative products in total sales could be a more 
accurate measure of the value accruing out of R&D investment than cash flow or profits. 
Below are listed the other explanatory variables included in X in equations (6) and (7): 
DOTH: This variable caries the effect of other hampering factors. This is a dummy 
variable that takes value one if a firm is constrained because of one of the following 
factors: (a) internal organization, (b) market uncertainties, or (c) regulation. The primary 
aim of constructing this variable is to see the effect of other hampering factors as 
uncertainty or institutional factors such as regulation and organizational rigidities on R&D 
intensity and to see the effect of financial constraint in the presence of such factors. 
DCOOPERATION: The literature on cooperation and R&D activities is not sparse. The 
crux of the issue lies in knowledge spillover and its effect on investment. Spillovers 
increase the relative profitability of R&D cooperation once spillovers are sufficiently high. 
But higher spillovers also increase the incentives to cheat by partner firms and the profits 
from free riding. Firms can increase the effectiveness of incoming spillovers by investing 
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in "absorptive capacity". Cohen and Levinthal (1989) show that external knowledge is 
more effective for the innovation process when the firm engages in own R&D. Increased 
absorptive capacity through investments in internal R&D efforts thus increases the 
effectiveness of incoming information. Also when firms are not direct competitors but 
market independent or produce complementary goods, cooperation is associated with 
higher R&D investment levels independently of the amount of spillovers. 
AGEix: In our specification we also include the age of the firms. CIS data do not 
provide this information. The birth date of the firm was obtained from the Business 
Register. 
LOG(MKTSHARE): This variable is a logarithmic transformation of the market share, 
defined as the ratio of sales of the firm to the total sales of the industry. It is a proxy for 
concentration or the degree of monopoly. Schumpeter (1942) argues that a firm is incited 
to innovate if it enjoys a monopoly position to prevent entry of potential rivals. 
Innovating firms are asked if they have introduced new products or processes into the 
market, and if so, if the new products or processes are (a) developed by the enterprise, (b) 
developed in alliance with third parties, or (c) developed mainly by third parties. 
PDOTH is a dummy equal to one if the new products were developed mainly by third 
parties. 
PDALOTH is a dummy equal to one if the introduced new products were developed in 
alliance with third parties. 
PCOTH is a dummy equal to one if the introduced new processes were developed 
mainly by third parties. 
PCAOTH is a dummy with value one if the new process were developed in alliance 
with third parties. 
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< INSERT TABLE 1 > 
 
The rationale for including these dummies in the specification can be found in Table 1. 
It is evident from that Table that the R&D intensity monotonically decreases with the 
degree of alliance. However, it should be mentioned that this is not the same as 
cooperation in R&D activities with other institutions. Summary statistics reveal, see Table 
2, that the mean R&D intensity is higher for those firms that have entered into cooperative 
arrangements with other institution than for those that have not, but also that the R&D 
intensity monotonically decreases with the degree of alliance in the introduction of new 
products or processes. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 2 > 
 
In our specifications we also include a dummy variable DSINPL, that takes value one if 
the enterprise does not belong to a group headed by a company that has more than one 
enterprises working for it. It could be quite possible that the firm in question, if faced with 
financial distress, could be bailed out by the company to which it belongs. It is also 
possible that the company to which this enterprise belongs engages in diverse activities and 
produces diverse products which reduces its risk of being bankrupt, thus enhancing its 
ability to borrow more.  
Earlier we have explained the construction of our binary variables DFIN. In our bid to 
explain what causes financial constraint we use Lewbel’s (2000, 2004) semiparametric 
estimator to estimate a binary choice model. For our estimation we choose a simple 
functional form for the function, fin-F, which is given by  
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                                          ),( iiiii XRVFfin ε+=− , 
where V and X include variables that parameterize the arguments in the function fin. R is a 
latent variable, which we assume to be a linear function of variables other than V, the very 
exogenous regressor, and the error term [epsilon]. Thus, the estimation equation is given 
by the following equation:  
 
                                                  )],(0[ iiii XRVIDFIN ε+≤=  
V in our model is the size of firms measured in terms of employment. The coefficient on V 
has been normalized to 1. The assumption on V is that it is an observed, continuously 
distributed covariate (or known function of covariates) with large supportx . It is known 
that small firms may be more tightly constrained because they have less access to 
internally generated funds for the financing of an innovation project and therefore have to 
approach outside financiers. These considerations imply that the size of the firm has a 
bearing on the financial wealth of the firm, especially with respect to financing of R&D 
investment from internal funds. Problems of information asymmetries may also be more 
severe for small firms in terms of raising outside finance. Moreover for smaller, newer 
firms there may be no track record upon which to base a case for funding and/or there may 
be fewer realizable assets to use as collateral. Thus size may have an implication in raising 
the required rate of return independently of the financial position of the firms. 
For the same reason as stated in the model on R&D intensity we use SINVi, the share of 
sales with innovative products in total sales of the firm, as a proxy for future expected 
profitability. 
As mentioned earlier, a proper explanation of a firm being financially constrained 
necessitates information on the balance sheet of the firms. But since we do not have such 
information we use the age of the firm, the log of market share, and a dummy if a firm 
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belongs to a group, as proxies for wealth. We include the age of the firm since it might be 
the case that long established firms that have survived exit are financially better than the 
new entrants. Age carries a reputation effect which can have a bearing on accessibility to 
outside funds. 
5  Results 
The section discussing the results has two subsections. The first section discusses the 
results of the sample selection model in which we establish the determinants of R&D 
intensity and the next section discusses the result of the binary choice model, where we 
seek to explain the probability of a firm being financially constrained. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 3 > 
5.1  R&D Intensity 
In this subsection, we discuss the results of the effect of the financial variable, DFIN, after 
controlling for the effect of other variables that influence the choice of R&D investment. 
Table 3 presents the result for R&D intensity. The estimates in the columns only differ 
in the choice of instruments. The common set of instruments for the two columns are the 
age of the firm (AGE); the logarithm of market share (LOG(MKTSHARE)), the lagged 
dummy variable for being financially constrained (DFIN-1); the lag of the share of 
innovative sales in the total output of the firm (SINV-1); the lag of the dummy equal to 1 if 
the firm cooperated with others in its R&D endeavors (DCOOPERATION-1); the lag of the 
log of market share, (LOG(MKTSHARE)-1); the dummy set equal to one if the firm did not 
belong to a group (DSINPL); the dummy indicating if the firm also did non technological 
innovation (DNONTECH) and its lag (DNONTECH-1); the dummy that is equal to one if 
new products were developed in alliance with third parties (PDALOTH); the dummy that 
 21
takes value one if new processes were developed in alliance with third parties 
(PCALOTH); the dummy variable that takes value 1 if non-technological reasons or market 
oriented reasons were important in driving innovation activities (NONTECHR); the 
dummy variable that takes value 1 if technological reasons were important in driving 
innovation activities (TECHR); total investment of the firm during the last period (INVT-1 
); and industry dummies. The instrument set in column (a) includes an additional variable 
PDOTH, which is a dummy set equal to one if the new products were developed mainly by 
third parties. Some of the variables in the list of instruments, like TECHR and 
NONTECHR, turned out to be insignificant and were therefore not included among the  
explanatory variables.  
The number of over identifying restrictions (number of instruments minus number of 
estimated coefficients) is equal to 2 in column (a) and 3 in column (b). The specifications 
in both columns satisfy the Sargan test that the over identifying orthogonality restrictions 
are not significantly different from zero.  
The results from the estimates suggest that, once other factors are controlled for, a firm 
is adversely affected in its pursuit of R&D activities, as measured by the R&D intensity, by 
the presence of financial constraints. The large negative sign on DFIN is testament to this 
fact. From our discussion of the model we know that, given the uncertainty, the risk of 
bankruptcy is large for firms that are not financially healthy. This risk plays an important 
part in reducing the amount of R&D investment. We include DOTH to assess the effect of 
other constraints. The results of our analysis suggest that such factors on their own also 
have a negative effect on the amount of R&D capital a firm wishes to use. The effects of 
the other constraints are much weaker than the financial constraints suggesting that, if there 
are any major hampering factors, then these are financial constraints. To capture the effect 
of financial constraints in the presence of other hampering factors, we include the 
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interaction of DFIN and DOTH, DFIN*DOTH. Our results imply that financial constraints 
are less binding if market uncertainties, institutional, or other hampering factors are also 
present (the coefficient of DFIN*DOTH is positive and statistically significant). The effect 
of financial constraints in the presence of other constraints is captured by the sum of the 
coefficients of DFIN, DFIN*DOTH, and DOTH. The F-statistic corresponding to the test 
of the null hypothesis that the sum of these coefficients is equal to zero is reported at the 
bottom of table 3. The restriction is marginally rejected in column (b) but not in column 
(a).  The estimated coefficients are rather similar in both columns. We can thus conclude 
that the total effect of all constraints is not significantly different from zero, but that the 
financial constraints alone are quite prominent and negatively affect the R&D intensity.   
Our results suggest that R&D intensity reacts strongly to SINV, which is the share of 
sales with innovative products in the total sales of the firm that we assumed to be a proxy 
for future expected profitability. The strong positive sign on SINV suggests that the higher 
is the future expected profitability, the higher is the R&D intensity. However, we find that 
firms that have a higher market share also have a lower R&D intensity. Not surprisingly, 
the sign of this coefficient is positive when we use the logarithm of R&D expenditure 
instead of the logarithm of R&D intensity as the dependent variable. These findings are not 
new; they only suggest that a monopoly firm does indeed invest more than a firm in a more 
competitive industry but proportionately less as it increases in size, as measured by salesxi . 
Our results suggest that, controlling for other factors, older firms tend to have a higher 
R&D intensity than younger firms and that the spillover effects of cooperation lead to 
higher R&D intensity. It could also suggest that the cooperative arrangements are made 
with non-rivals or with firms that are engaged in producing complementary goodsxii . The 
negative sign of variable DSINPL indicates that firms that do not belong to a group have a 
lower R&D intensity than those that do belong to a group. Enterprises belonging to a group 
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could be special units, set up with the purpose of carrying out R&D activities for the whole 
group. 
5.2  Financial Constraint 
This section discusses the results of the binary choice models in which we seek to explain 
the determinants of the financial constraint itself. Our dependent variable is DFIN which is 
the binary variable that takes value one if the firms finds itself being financially 
constrained and zero otherwise. As stated earlier, to handle the potential endogeneity of the 
regressors we use Lewbel’s (2000, 2004) semiparametric estimator. 
To estimate the binary choice model we construct another dependent variable DFIN*,  
which is DFIN-I(V≥0) weighted by the inverse of the conditional density function of the 
negative of the logarithm of the size of the firm, measured in terms of employment, the 
very exogenous variable V, to use the same notation as in Lewbel’s (2000, 2004) papers. I 
is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the argument in parentheses is true. The 
conditioning variable is the union of all the explanatory variables and the instruments. We 
take the negative of the logarithm of size because one of the assumptions of the model is 
that, as V decreases, the probability of DFIN being zero increases (refer to footnote 9). In 
Lewbel’s method, the division by the conditional density of V, converts V to a uniform 
distribution. 
The results of the binary choice model in which we seek to explain the determinants of 
financial constraint are presented in Table 4. The set of instruments in all columns contains 
DOTH, DOTH-1, AGE, DSINPL, LOG(MKTSHARE), 1( )LOG MKTSHARE − , 
1DCOOPERATION− , PDOTH, PDALOTH, PCALOTH, PCOTH, SINV-1, DNONTECH, 
DNONTECH-1, lagged size, and sectoral dummies. 
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The more striking results of this part of our analysis are the coefficient estimates that 
we obtain on age and DSINPL. The results suggest that the more aged a firm is, the less 
likely it is to be financially constrained and significantly so. This is understandable, since 
older firms, having survived preemption, are more likely to be financially stable than new 
firms. Also, older firms have a better reputation than younger firms, and therefore they 
have greater access to external funds. Secondly, the estimation results indicate that a firm 
is more likely to be financially constrained if it does not belong to a group. This could 
suggest that if it belongs to a group, then it has at its disposal some alternative avenues of 
financing its projects that are closed to firms that do not belong to a group. The fact that it 
belongs to a group may be an indication that the group is engaged in diverse activities and 
thus less prone to risk than a single enterprise engaged in a single activity. As explained 
earlier, DFIN is a function of the financial state variables. In the absence of information on 
the balance sheets, the effect of financial state variables is included in the error term. 
Hence, the instruments that are supposed to be correlated with the regressors are also 
correlated with the error term. But since the results of the test of over identifying 
restrictions do not lead to rejection, we conclude that age and the dummy indicating that 
the firm belongs to group are picking up the effects of financial variables. 
As explained earlier the binary variable DFIN is an indicator of the firm’s willingness 
to undertake R&D activity as well as of its financial position. As a proxy for future 
expected profitability we experiment both with the current value of the share of innovative 
sales SINV and with its lag. Our results suggest that controlling for other variables, the 
probability of a firm being financially constrained is higher, the higher is its future 
expected profitability, as proxied by SINV or its lag, but not significantly so. 
The results in Table 4 also suggest that a firm facing a priori hampering factors other 
than financial constraints are less willing to undertake R&D activities and are thus less 
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likely to be hit by financial constraints. The results on over identification restrictions do 
not suggest that there is simultaneity in the determination of DOTH and DFIN, since 
DOTH is included in the instrumental variables. 
6  Conclusions 
In this paper we empirically investigate the determinants of R&D and investment. In 
particular, our aim is to see how financial constraints affect a firm’s R&D intensity. We 
find that a firm that reports that it is financially constrained but not otherwise constrained 
is adversely affected in its pursuit of R&D activity. Financial constraints have a large and a 
significant impact in affecting R&D investment. 
However, financial constraints are less binding if the firm runs up into other hampering 
factors or other constraints that are not a function of financial constraint itself. We obtain 
this result both by looking at the effect of financial constraint on R&D intensity in the 
presence of other constraints, such as market uncertainty, institutional constraints and 
organizational rigidities, and looking at the probability for a firm to be financially 
constrained in the presence of other than financial constraints. We also find that the effect 
of these other constraints is much weaker than that of financial constraint, which confirms 
the findings of many papers that financial factors are the major stumbling block in pursuit 
of any activity. However, this does not diminish the fact that institutional and 
organizational rigidities also reduce the amount or R&D investment. Policy makers while 
taking into account the hampering factors that inhibit R&D activities should also consider 
such factors. Also, since financial constraint seems to be the most important factor that 
inhibits R&D activities, policy makers should consider setting up institutions that would 
allow economically sound projects get the required finance to be carried out. In particular, 
care should be taken of young firms and firms that do not belong to a group, since these 
firms are the ones that are more susceptible to the exigencies of nature, as is well reflected 
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in our analysis. Finally, as a comment on financial constraint, we note that, age and group 
membership, as proxies for the financial wealth of a firm, appear to be significant 
predictors of a firm being financially constrained. 
One of the shortcomings of our paper is that, we have not used financial information 
from the balance sheet of the firms, but instead used proxies for financial state variables. 
As a part of our future research agenda we would like to enrich our model by using data 
from the balance sheet of the firms in the explanation of financial constraint. Also, for our 
future research we plan to carry out our investigation of financial constraint on R&D 
investment in a dynamic setting by using more waves of CIS data. This would also 
necessitate a dynamic model of financial constraint and investment. 
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Appendix A   A Model of Financial Constraint  
In this appendix we present a model of financial constraint and study the decision of a firm 
to innovate and how much to invest in R&D in the presence of financial constraintsxiii . 
Firms wish to undertake risky ventures but lack the necessary resources, so they turn to the 
investors, banks or other deposit-taking, financial institutions, for external finance. Venture 
capital and other types of non-deposit private equity are not considered in our analysis. The 
firm’s initial net wealth is W0=A0-R0, where A0 is the firms’s initial liquid assets and R0 the 
firm’s initial indebtedness. Assume that the firms need of R&D expenditure R is greater 
than W0. The firm is assumed to be risk-neutral; it maximizes the expected present value of 
its “wealth”. The returns to the risky venture are described by a revenue function f: an 
investment of R units produces a revenue of f(s,R) units in state s, s being the state of 
nature. The revenue function is also assumed to exhibit decreasing returns to scale. 
Assume that ;.)(),( RsRsf φ= , “.” represents other parameters characterizing the firm. A 
crucial assumption is that agents have asymmetric information. The firm observes the 
states free of charge, but the lender can only observe the states by paying some 
observational cost. Gale and Hellwig (1985) have shown that the optimal contract between 
the firm and the lender is a standard debt contract, which involves a fixed repayment 
obligation lR , and a declaration of bankruptcy if and only if the repayment obligation 
cannot be met, and a confiscation of whatever wealth remains in the event of bankruptcy. 
Under an optimal contract the firm takes into account the possible chances of 
bankruptcy. If the firm declares bankruptcy its revenue is reduced to ;.)(Rsφα , where 
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0≤α≤1, and it suffers a fixed nonpecuniary penalty whose monetary equivalent is K≥0. 
Under an optimal contract the firm solves the following problem: 
                        ]),;(Pr[]),;([max
,
ll
RR
RCONFCRsRCONFCRsE <−− + φφ                       (10)  
subject to  
                                                                                                       (11) ))(1( 0
~
WRirRE l −+≥
                                                                                   R≥0, 
where , denotes a probability, the expectation is taken over the 
states of nature, ir is the risk free rate of return, FC is firm characteristics, CON is other 
constraints such as institutional factors that deter firms from taking up R&D activities and 
 is given by  
},0,max{][ XX ≡+ Pr[.]
lR
~
                                                 RR =~             if lRRs ≥;.)(φ , and  
  if ;.)(
~
RsR φα= lRRs <;.)(φ .  
lR
~
 is a random variable, which is the lender’s gross return under a standard debt contract. 
lR , under the standard debt contract is the fixed payment to the lender when the firm is 
solvent. In the event of bankruptcy, that is, if lRRs <;.)(φ , the revenue is reduced to 
;.)(Rsφα , and since the lender is allowed to recoup whatever he/she can, the lender’s 
revenue in the state of bankruptcy is ;.)(Rsφα . One can interpret ;.)()1( Rsφα−  as the cost 
borne by the lender for investigation in the event bankruptcy. Equation (11) is the zero 
profit condition of the lender, which states that the expected return from lending to the firm 
should be at least equal the amount he/she can earn from lending the same amount at the 
risk free rate of interest ir. Let Rop be the solution to (10) and (11). 
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To invoke the notion of financial constraint let us now see what happens under the 
assumption that both the lender and the firm can directly observe the state of nature. In 
such a situation, which is termed first best, since the firm and the lender share the same 
information about the nature of the project and the lender can costlessly observe the states 
of nature, the problem of firm as well as the lender is the same. This can be written as  
 
                                            )}.)(1(,.)({max 0WRirRsfER −+−                                       (12)                         
 
Let, Rfb be the solution to the above problem. Gale and Hellwig (1985) have shown that 
Rfb≥Rop and that Rfb>Rop if 0],.)(Pr[ >< lRRsφ  and α<1, that is to say that the amount 
R&D capital demanded in the first best situation is at least as great as the amount lent 
under an optimal contract and is strictly greater if there is a positive probability of 
bankruptcy and if the cost borne by the lender ;.)()1( Rsφα−  is positive. 
Let r be the equilibrium rate of interest that the firm pays so that the lender’s zero-
profit constraint is satisfied. This rate of interest r in (13) is the interest rate actually paid 
by the firm when it is not bankrupt and is given by:  
 
                                                         lop RWRr =−+ ))(1( 0 .                                               
(13) 
This implies that  
                                                               ),( lop RRrr = . 
However, it should be noted that both Rop and lR  are determined simultaneously and are 
functions of the distribution of the states of nature, which we denote here by h(s); firm 
characteristics, FC; the organizational and the institutional constraints that the firm faces 
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and which deters a firm from taking up R&D activities, CON; the liquid wealth W0 that the 
firm has at its disposal and the risk free rate of interest ir. Hence 
                                                 ),,),(( irCONFCERR opop π= ,                                          
(14) 
and 
                                                  ( ( ), , , )l lR R E FC CON irπ= .                                           (15) 
Here we seek to capture the distribution of the states of nature on which a firm bases its 
expectation with a single variable, E(π), the expected future profitability and is given 
by . dsshRsRsEE )()()]([)( φφπ ′=′≡ ∫
Gale and Hellwig (1985, 1986) and Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2006) show that  
, xiv0<′
irop
R 0>′
Wop
R , where “ ′ ” denotes the derivative of the variable with respect to the 
subscript variable.  It can also be shown that 0>′
Eop
R  and 0<′
CONop
R . In words this means 
that as the risk free rate of interest rises the demand for R&D capital decreases, as the 
liquid wealth of the firm increases the demand for R&D capital decreases and as the future 
expected profitability, E(π) increases the demand for R&D capital increases. Also since the 
fixed payment to the lender when the firm is solvent, lR , increases with the amount lent, 
the effect of ir, , E(π), and CON on 0W lR  are qualitatively the same as those on Rop. 
Equation (14) and (15) imply thatxv  
 
                                                ),,),(( irCONFCErr π= .                                                 (16)                          
Since the demand for R&D capital increases in expectation of future profitability it can be 
shown that  and since the demand decreases due to presence of institutional factors 
that hamper R&D activities, 
0>′Er
0<′CONr . Also since the demand for external sources of 
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funding decreases with the increase in the internal wealth of the firm, this implies that 
.Define the function fin0
0
<′Wr xvi  as  
 
                                            },),,,),({( επ irCONFCEfinfin =                                         (17) 
where ε is an idiosyncratic disturbance term. The inequalities discussed above imply 
that ,0≥′Enfi 0≤′CONnfi , and 00 ≤′Wnfi . We say that a firm is financially constrained if, 
                                                                                                                             (18) Ffin ≥
that is, if the rate of interest demanded by the lender on an extra unit of loan exceeds a 
certain threshold, which the firm is unable to meet. Consequently the firm would not be 
able to meet its required R&D investment level. The rate of interest corresponding to the 
threshold could be thought of as the interest rate on the maximum amount of debt a firm 
can incur. This threshold can differ from firm to firm depending on the financial position 
of the firm. For example, consider two firms that are equal in every respect but one firm 
has a better financial position than the other. The firm that is in a better financial position is 
less likely to hit its debt limit than the firm whose financial position is not sound. It should 
be noted that what is driving these results is the positive probability of bankruptcy. Ceteris 
paribus, worse the financial position of the firm, greater is the loan demanded which 
implies higher the fixed repayment obligation and thus greater the chances of bankruptcy. 
Appendix B   A Note on Estimation 
Given our estimation model equation (6) and (7)  
 
1 2 3 4( )LR SINV DFIN X V Dβ β β β ε= + + + +  
[0 ( , , , )]D I V M SINV DFIN X e= ≤ +  
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where LR, the log of R&D intensity is the outcome and D is the decision variable to 
innovate. D takes value = 1 if the firm chooses to innovate and zero otherwise. Define  
 
* *
1 2 3( (U Z LR SINV DFIN X V 4 ))β β β β= − + + + , 
where Z is the vector of instruments and LR* is the unobserved R&D intensity for firms 
which report to be non-innovators and therefore do not report their R&D intensity. In such 
a situation the coefficients of the model could be estimated by two stage least squares or a 
GMM technique using the moment condition *( ) 0E U = . But what we observe in fact is U, 
which is given by  
 
1 2 3 4( ( ))U Z LR SINV DFIN X V Dβ β β β= − + + + . 
In the presence of selection, GMM or two stage least squares is infeasible because we only 
observe LR and not LR*, and unobservables that determine the selection such as M, the 
unobserved latent variable, are correlated with LR* and U*. But the estimation of the 
required coefficients could become feasible given a consistent estimator of . Define 
the weighting scalar W by W=D/f(V|Y) where f is the conditional probability density 
function of V, introduced earlier, given Y, which is the union of the set of instruments and 
the other covariates, that is, DFIN, SINV and X, that appear in equation (6). Lewbel (2006) 
shows that  
*( )E U
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.                                         (19)    
The main assumptions required for equation (19) to hold are that the support of V|Y 
contains the support of -M|Y (these could all equal the real line, for example), and that  
 36
 YVMUYV |~,,| *                                                 (20) 
                                                              
that is, V is conditionally independent of the unobserved latent variables of the model, 
conditioning on the set of covariates X. Given the above, our estimates are based on the 
moment conditions: 
1 2 3 4[ ( ( ))]E ZW LR SINV DFIN X V 0β β β β− + + + = . 
We estimate the above by using the method of two stage least squares. To estimate the 
conditional density of V given Y, f(V|Y), we employ the nonparametric density estimator 
described in Lewbel and Schennach (2007). To obtain estimated standard errors we use the 
formula’s derived by Lewbel. As suggested by Lewbel (2004), we also applied the 
bootstrap to obtain standard errors. The results appeared to be similar to those obtained 
using analytical formula’s for the asymptotic variances of the estimators. Therefore, we do 
not report them here. 
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Appendix C  Part of the Questionnaire asking Respondents to fill 
up Information on Hampering Factors    
 
 
Source: Community Innovation Survey 3 
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Table 1:  Mean Distribution of R&D Intensity along Alliance in the Introduction in 
New Products and Process   
 
 Mainly by Cooperation Mainly by 
 your with third parties 
 enterprise third parties  
Product 1.45 .68 .35 
 (1363) (679) (296) 
    
Process 1.70 .77 .24 
 (643) (601) (441) 
The figures in parentheses are the number of observations. 
These numbers are from the full sample of CIS 3.5, which has 10628 observations. 
  
 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics of the Variables of Interest   
 
Variables for Innovating Firms  
 Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
LR -5.09 3.80 -19.70 4.84 
SINV 17.15 22.61 0 100 
DCOOPERATION .41 .49 0 1 
PDALOTH .21 .41 0 1 
PDOTH .08 .28 0 1 
PCALOTH .16 .36 0 1 
PCOTH .08 .28 0 1 
Variables for All the Firms  
 Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
DFIN 0.04 0.21 0 1 
DOTH 0.11 0.32 0 1 
DFIN*DOTH 0.04 0.18 0 1 
LOG(MKTSHARE) -8.88 2.27 -18.26 -0.48 
SIZE 218.34 1014.91 2.67 39591.50 
DSINPL 0.44 0.50 0 1 
AGE 22.37 11.59 2.00 35.00 
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Table 3:  Determinants of R&D Intensity 
 
 
 
 
Significance levels:  *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. Industry dummies are controlled for. For list of instruments, see section 
5.1 
Very Exogenous Variable: Size in 100 
Dependent Variable: Log of R&D Intensity  
 (a) (b) 
DFIN -41.65 *** -41.66 *** 
 (11.44)  (11.45)  
DFIN*DOTH 44.44 *** 44.45 *** 
 (11.44)  (11.45)  
DOTH -1.77 *** -1.74 *** 
 (0.59)  (0.62)  
DCOOPERATION 0.75 *** 0.74 *** 
 (0.19)  (0.20)  
SINV 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 
 (0.01)  (0.02)  
AGE 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
LOG(MKTSHARE) -0.18 *** -0.17 *** 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  
DSINPL -0.29 * -0.28 * 
 (0.17)  (0.17)  
PDOTH 3.05 *** 2.97 *** 
 (0.45)  (0.73)  
PDALOTH -0.20  -0.20  
 (0.42)  (0.42)  
PCOTH -9.57 *** -9.63 *** 
 (1.24)  (1.31 ) 
PCALOTH -1.04 *** -1.05 *** 
 (0.40)  (0.40)  
Sargan Test 6.04   6.02   
Degrees of Freedom 3  2  
P-Value 0.11  0.05  
F-stat 3.86  3.65  
P-Value 0.049   0.056   
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 Table 4:  Determinants of Financial Constraint  
 
Very Exogenous Variable: Log of Size 
Dependent Variable: DFIN, Binary variable indicating if the firm was financially 
constrained or not 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 SINV 0.36  -0.06      
 (0.35)  (0.59)      
SINV-1   22.61  20.6  20.87  
   (25.9)  (15.18)  (15.1)  
DOTH -15.25 ∗ -13.09  -13.46  -13.31  
 (9.36)  (9.67)  (8.87)  (8.84)  
AGE -0.96 ∗∗∗ -0.94 ∗∗∗ -0.95 ∗∗∗ -0.95 ∗∗∗
 (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.24)  
LOG(MKTSHARE) 0.16  0.27  0.25    
 (1.38)  (1.38)  (1.36)    
DSINPL 17.45 ∗∗∗ 17.65 ∗∗∗ 17.62 ∗∗∗ 17.54 ∗∗∗
 (5.54)  (5.53)  (5.53)  (5.51)  
Sargan Test 13.23  12.51  12.52  12.55  
Degrees of Freedom10  9  10  11  
P-value 0.21  0.19  0.25  0.32  
Significance levels:  *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. Industry dummies are controlled for. For list of instruments, see section 
5.2 
 
  
 41
The UNU-MERIT WORKING Paper Series 
 
2007-01 Developing science, technology and innovation indicators: what we can 
learn from the past by Christopher Freeman & Luc Soete 
  
2007-02 The impact of innovation activities on productivity and firm growth: 
evidence from Brazil by Micheline Goedhuys 
 
2007-03 Estimations of US debt dynamics: Growth cum debt and the savings glut in 
Kouri’s model by Thomas Ziesemer 
 
2007-04 States and Firms on the Periphery: The Challenges of a Globalising World 
by Gabriel R.G. Benito & Rajneesh Narula 
 
2007-05 How Do Consumers Make Choices? A Summary of Evidence from 
Marketing and Psychology by Zakaria Babutsidze 
 
2007-06 Inter-firm Technology Transfer: Partnership-embedded Licensing or 
Standard Licensing Agreements? by John Hagedoorn, Stefanie Lorenz-
Orlean & Hans Kranenburg 
 
2007-07 The Behavior of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator of Dynamic Panel Data 
Sample Selection Models by Wladimir Raymond, Pierre Mohnen, Franz 
Palm & Sybrand Schim van der Loeff 
 
2007-08 Location and R&D alliances in the European ICT industry by Rajneesh 
Narula & Grazia D. Santangelo 
 
2007-09 How do social capital and government support affect innovation and 
growth? Evidence from the EU regional support programmes by Semih 
Akcomak & Bas ter Weel 
 
2007-10 The Micro-Dynamics of Catch Up in Indonesian Paper Manufacturing: An 
International Comparison of Plant-Level Performance by Michiel van Dijk 
& Adam Szirmai 
 
2007-11 Financial Constraint and R&D Investment: Evidence from CIS by Amaresh 
K Tiwari, Pierre Mohnen, Franz C. Palm & Sybrand Schim van der Loeff 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ University of Maastricht, A.Tiwari@KE.unimaas.nl 
♣ University of Maastricht, MERIT and CIRANO, P.Mohnen@MERIT.unimaas.nl 
⊥ University of Maastricht and CESifo fellow, F.Palm@KE.unimaas.nl 
Ψ University of Maastricht, S.Loeff@KE.unimaas.nl 
♠ The authors would like to thank the referees and the editors of this volume for their suggestions. We would 
also like to thank the seminar participants at Lille and the participants of the workshop on Innovation System 
and Firm Performance, in particular the discussant of this paper, Hans Lööf, for their valuable comments. 
iThe data collected through CIS are at the enterprise level and not at the company level. Here we use the term 
firm and enterprise exchangeably. 
iiSee Gale and Hellwig (1985) for a detailed discussion. 
iiiWe now ignore the risk free rate of interest ir, since it should stay constant for a single period of survey. 
ivAppendix B carries a note on the estimation. 
vOut of 1531 innovating firms, 107 or about 7 percent of them do not have R&D expenditure for the period 
of the survey. 
viTo make sure that V or the log of size has a large support we demean it. With this exercise, we make sure 
that V takes negative as well as positive values. 
viiNilsen and Schiantarelli (2003) find strong statistical evidence of this relationship, including much greater 
incidences of zero investments in small versus large plants. They attribute this relevance of plant size both to 
the presence of absolute as well as relative fixed costs and to potential indivisibilities in investment. 
viiiSee Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003) 
ixThe age of the firms are available from 1967 onwards. 
xAn implication of the large support assumption for V is that, for any value X [and epsilon] may take on, it is 
possible for V to be small enough to make D=0 , with probability one, or large enough to make D=1 with 
probability one. 
xiSee Cohen, Levin and Mowery (1987) and Geroski (1990). 
xiiSee De Bondt et al. (1992) and Röller et al. (1997). 
xiiiSee Gale and Hellwig (1985) for a detailed discussion. 
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xivHowever,Gale and Hellwig (1986) show it is not generally true that a reduction in the firm’s internal funds 
leads to a reduction in investment. They show that the relation between the firm’s net wealth and investment 
is exceedingly complicated. Formally, this complexity is due to the nonconvexity that arises from the 
possibility of bankruptcy. Conceptually, the difficulties arise from the strategic interaction between the 
borrower’s interests and the lender’s interests. 
To understand the basic difficulty, consider the situation when the firm has some prior debt so that its 
liquid net wealth is negative. A lender may be willing to roll over the prior debt if he receives an appropriate 
claim on the surplus that the enterprise generates. In this situation, the lender is likely to insist on an 
investment level that is sufficient to generate a substantial surplus. If the marginal returns to investment are 
unaffected by the costs of bankruptcy, e.g., if the cost of bankruptcy is a fixed nonmonetary cost falling on 
the borrower, then for very low (negative) levels of the firm’s net wealth, the chosen investment level will 
actually be close to the first-best level, because that maximizes the expected surplus that can be made 
available to the lender. At this point, the marginal bankruptcy cost of investment to the firm becomes 
irrelevant because the firm only has the choice between an immediate default on its prior debt and an 
investment policy that is acceptable to the lender. 
Thus it may happen that investment is close to the first-best level both if the firm’s net wealth is very 
high so that little outside capital is needed and if the firm’s net wealth is very low so that lenders are barely 
willing to roll over the firm’s prior debts. 
However, for intermediate wealth levels, investment will be strictly less than the first-best level because 
the firm takes account of the marginal bankruptcy costs of increased borrowing. In our paper we assume that 
the wealth level of the firm lies in the region that Gale and Hellwig (1986) characterize as intermediate 
wealth levels. There are three reasons for this assumption. Firstly, R&D activities are mostly taken by firms 
that have a reasonably sound financial position, secondly, for our analysis we only take those firms that 
appear both in CIS3 and CIS3.5, that is those firms who since the last survey have survived till the current 
survey and hence are either likely to be large or growing firms, and thirdly, if there is a situation, where the 
lender is likely to insist on an investment level that is sufficient to generate a substantial surplus and the firm 
only has the choice between an immediate default on its prior debt and an investment policy that is 
acceptable to the lender then there would be no financial constraint. 
 44
                                                                                                                                                    
xvIn fact the rate of interest r does not have an independent meaning in the context of the model. It is just 
another characterization of the fixed repayment obligation of the firm, lR . We only introduce it here so that 
we can write the model to be estimated. 
xviWe now ignore the risk free rate of interest ir, since it should stay constant for a single period of survey. 
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